[Bell Toll] we have a today’s talk by someone who’s currently local in the sense that he’s he is and has been for now for some almost two years I’m gonna get this wrong Marie Curie yeah it’s an EU fellowship we’ve given to scholars to come to the United States American University in the aim of building relationships between American and EU universities we’re the beneficiaries so no complaining dr. Mohamed Ali Adraoui is a French political scientist working in contemporary international relations in contemporary Islam he holds a PhD from the Sciences Po in Paris for his work on contemporary Salafism he’s right now working on a blog project I mean it’s kind of usually we have people from Europe or anywhere else in the world they’re here to talk to us about their parts of the world but actually here he’s here to talk about his current project which is about our part of the world in the United States and political Islam dealing with the Muslim Brotherhood in the end in the Arab revolutions he’s also how held a position European University Institute in Florence and National University of Singapore that’s why you’re asking us if we’re ever down and his book on Salafism in France is currently under contract with Oxford University Press he’s also edited volume on Islamist movements foreign policies published by Edinburgh University which he nicely gave me a copy of what I enjoyed so he’s here to talk about his current project and we’ll have lots of question good afternoon to all of you I’m honored to be here in order to tell you about my current research which I’m extremely excited about first of all I’d like to start by saying thank you tonight for hosting me here and such exciting people and talk to the everyday almost thanks to people and this research is also this current research living with how the US has been seeing as has been framing has been interacting with the people we call who call themselves the Muslim brothers especially in Egypt so this presentation is part of an ongoing research that I am currently conducting in the School of Foreign Service and dealing mainly with two things a historical investigation on the US diplomatic archives related to the u.s Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood relations for one century then a more contemporary approach dedicated to studying how the US has tried to find the finest towards the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt especially when this movement achieved huge electoral success years ago and seized power at the head of the Egyptian state before they were overthrown by the military coup occurred in July 2013 what makes this research original at least hopefully according to me they will add a political scientist and historian of international relations this research is original in three ways first it is an interaction of what I’m spending I’ve been studying it has to do with the sort of interaction between the traditional state seeking to defend its interests and a religiously political actual public itself towards the Muslim second the Muslim Brotherhood is a movement whose political ethics overtly aim to reverse the structures of this international being just a very quick example for instance in 2010 over a weekly sermon called how Islam comforts the oppression and tyranny against Muslims Mohammed [Arabic] suffering today a life sentence in prison after he was arrested in August 2013 after the coup described the United States as a country that is easy to defeat in violence since it represents a power in quotes experiencing the beginning of its ends and this power is heading towards its demise the Islamist leader actually went even further by claiming that in quotes again the resistance is the only solution against American arrogance and tyranny and third point third interest the double dimension of the Islamist political fork is its identity in the platform effectively despite its status as a transnational movement Islamism and its followers especially the Egyptian [Arabic] seeks to

exercise power by taking positions at the head of states so my aim is to assess how the people in charge have framed understood political Islam through their public declarations but while also focusing on the intellectual Academic and strategic debate that had been influencing the stances taken by US leaders and diplomats when it comes to the islamist issue US leaders and diplomats have attempted to bring islamist leaders to a common field based upon shared conception of what an acceptable policy is of course in the US understanding the mentality to do so they have used moral incentives in particular such as our compliments but also criticism or warning civilising we aim to channel the Brotherhood’s possible integralism against the US historically the US administration has constantly balanced between two stances from this particular perspective fear of the radical part of the Islamist ideology and a confidence in seeing it become moderate especially in the wake of debates in academic and policy oriented research fields according to the decisions made by the islamist leadership one trend seems to have overtaken another in the discursive work of what i called the taming process for all attempts to establish some rules of the game are indeed based on years of debates and discussions on the nature of political Islam especially its capacity of generating moderate according to US interpretations of course so having to deal with the Brotherhood at the end of the biggest Arab state was not necessarily enjoyed but the US leadership progressively we move on to what I would call an open door policy making it possible to question their attempt to set up a modus vivendi the force seeking originally to get rid of US supremacy in the region that’s my main point so these are basically the key questions that I’m going to address my research is interdisciplinary I use different tools and more contemporary international relations approach in interviews because reports sorry and discourse analysis so these two questions are first of all how the US has been interpreting and framing the Muslim Brotherhood ideology and political analysts and the second question is how to socialize or contain these potentials the first thing is I’ve been working for now almost two years on the US State Department archives and what can I say that is what we do the archives teach us in terms of what the US diplomats have been saying about the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt so these are reports about the Muslim Brotherhood made by the US diplomats were based in Cairo at the US Embassy there and this first report you know dates back 1944 and that’s in my view at least and all the colleagues who are working on this issue this seem to agree with that the idea that the first report was made in 1944 and we know that the Muslim Brotherhood was founded in 1927 28 is funny here is that you can see I mean was founded according to the first US diplomat in 1958 so even the foundation date was not the right one and the idea is dangerous so the idea that we need to wait until 1944 to have the first report dealing with the Muslim Brotherhood is extremely interesting because for years and years it means that this issue was almost inexistent before it was diplomatic so how can so what can we draw from the mistake in terms of lessons so the Ikhwan the brothers they are a danger so here I’m focusing on the last paragraph the danger of the Ikhwan is the fanatical principles which it professes and according to the Brotherhood in as much that Egypt is a Muslim state and it should be governed by Quranic law everything non-muslim should be detested so it is a fanatical and possibly violent movement the context in which this report was made has to do with two things the first of all it is extremely interesting and extremely fascinating to a large extent because there was a letter sent by the Muslim brothers leaders at exile to the US ambassador saying two things basically that the US as a democratic country should pressure exchange with colonial powers in Europe like for instance Britain we know at that time France and for example Britain were extremely powerful in terms of colonial powers and the US was

requested to put some pressure on their allies in order you know to facilitate the operation of like or even a country like here Egypt obviously because Egypt was the real ruler of Egypt sorry Britain was the real ruler of Egypt even after the so-called official independence in 1922 we are in the 40s and the British are still ruling the country that’s the first thing the second thing is the question of Palestine see here the two first paragraphs the idea that at that time we have an ongoing colonization process in Palestine is extremely important to the Muslim Brothers and once again the US ambassador and of course the major and high-profile diplomats they were a very let’s say put pressure on you know and they wanted you know they were asking to put some pressure on the Zionist movement in Palestine at that time so we can see from the beginning at least in the US expected that the anti-colonial I mean approach is the key parameter in the way political Islam was framed and if you like the historical anecdotes for the very first time because the letter was written in Arabic there was no person who was fluent in Arabic at that time in the embassy and for the very first time when they somebody was hired speaking Arabic it was due to this letter because there was nobody to translate the piece a few years later so this is another piece here we are in 1952 so a few months after the military coup the [Arabic] the coup undertaken by the free officers the free military in Egypt in 1953 we are few years after in first report and the idea here that you can clearly see I’m going to quote some paragraphs the idea that the most important in this context from partners for the US leadership is a key component actually the cold war had had started obviously the military regime is much closer to the Soviet Union than it used and for example the monarchy used to be much closer to Britain of course than the US and the idea that the Muslim brothers could be used or could be they could be partners they could be a possible allies in the US have an interest is extremely important from let’s say 1953 onwards for example over here you have a report dealing with an interview made by the at that time Frank Gaffney and he used to talk quite frequently on a frequent basis to the leaders at that time so the leader at that time is Hasan al-Hudaybi Hasan al-Banna the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood was killed assassinated in October 1949 and you have here the reports and what he said I mean the topics that were tackled in these discussions and we have here I mean the proof evidence that the main leaders were let’s say partners but they were at that time I mean there used to be a discussion an open channel discussion we have people like Said Ramadan you know him father of Tariq Ramadan Mahmoud [Arabic] and here it’s Robert Macklin embassy yes same name absolutely that’s terrible that’s pretty violent so yeah I idea here that the Brotherhood are no longer is quite you know considered to be a fanatical movement is extremely important and for example but maybe it’s too small I’m going to give you two or three main ideas here the questions that are tackled by the US diplomats are this type of questions are you pro free market economy what would you what would you do I mean if one day you come to power would you be able you know to work in the US could you be basically our partners that’s the main idea are you in favor of the values we have been defending and of course you have the response here made by the guide by Hudaybi and and his friends the idea for example I asked the supreme guide what attitude his group took with respect to the future form of government of Egypt okay he said the Ikwan the brothers wanted the government to be founded on Quranic lines I asked so the diplomat if this would mean doing away with the banking system and the elimination of interest the RIBA you know that and he said that under the Quran a way could be found to maintain banks but that he would prefer if possible to abolish interest because it’s forbidden in there when I explained the difficulty which would mention if Egypt were to get foreign capital in the form of loans the supreme guide so Hudaybi confessed that this was a valid point and said that the Quran would permit in cases of necessity a less strict interpretation of the prophet’s ban on interest so I mean the partnership start to get more and more obvious when you study

the archives there is a huge problem and by the way I forgot to mention one very important thing it’s an ongoing research so I still have some gaps to fill unfortunately well I mean I have to let me the pretty reasonable amount of archives into until the 60s and the 70s which is basically because if I want to summarize the type of relationship between the US on the one hand and the brothers on the other hand is the factor as much as Nasser for example is seen as close to the Soviet Union you know this Way’s crisis the six day wars and so on and so forth the brothers are seen you know it’s like you have you know a reverse correlation and the brothers are seen and framed as a potential ally and the idea for example that they are the world used to be in there in this regard a initially they were seen as a fanatical and radical movement it tends to disappear I mean at the benefit of being more moderate in being seen as possible partners and allies when it comes to challenging at that time Nasser’s rule because when it comes to the eighties or let’s say after after in the late seventies onwards the archives are no longer declassified so I have written to the us state department and it takes months or maybe years in order to get approval so unfortunately what I have here fortunately depends the idea here is that I’ve managed to get my information by interviewing people so what I can say for example that the early eighties extremely important because for the very first time at least from a Western perspective for the very first time we have a public assassination in 1981 of the Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and at that time we know for for the very first time we have a mention to a religious extremist ideology which is interesting because today it seems quite obvious but at that time what I mentioned in my interview with some US diplomats who were in charge for example in the Bureau of Middle Eastern affairs department the confessed actually that there was no real interests you know for this radical extremist political ideology and one with extremely important at that time high profile person he said that it was still the Cold War fervor that was dictating US diplomats what they had to believe in terms of political beliefs and what a very another anecdote is extremely interesting because even the assassination and warrants and that was seen as the conspiracy or the result of a plot from the Soviet Union and the [Arabic] the groups the Islamic groups in charge of responsible or guilty for killing Sadat they were seen at that time in the early 80s as possibly connected to the Soviet Union I mean there was no independent let’s saya Islamist action outside of the framework Let me move now to the early 90s which is a turning point this man here is Edward Djerejian he was an extremely influential person he was an ambassador he’s now more as a scholar at the at Rice University he’s the director of the Baker’s Institute he’s extremely knowledgeable in the field of u.s. foreign policy in the Middle East before the case and he’s the very first one let’s say who established you know a sort of doctrine or official position US position when it comes to the idea of dealing or not dealing with some religious actors radical extremist actors I don’t if some of you have ever heard of this famous speech the meridian house speech june 2nd of june 1992 for the very first time we are now pretty sure that the Cold War is no longer relevant we are pretty sure now that there is no such thing as a huge global strategic threat I mean connected to the Russian influence at least that’s what they believed at that time, the state department for the very first time at this high level the notion or the rise or the threat caused by a religious extremism connected to Islam is at that time 1989 1991 should remember that you had the Algerian crisis was a paramount experience and for the very first time in the Arab countries we had a surge a huge success generated by the Islamist engagement into classical politics with the [Arabic] in English the Front for Islamic Salvation and for the very first time well we have somebody wondering at this level here in the US he was the assistant at that time the assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian pears and so easily he pronounced a famous speech called the Meridian house speech not far from here in which this is

basically what he argued the religion Islam in this is case is not necessarily a determinant positive or negative thing you know in the nature or quality of our relations with our countries our quarrel is with extremism and violence denial intolerance intimidation coercion and terror which too often accompany it okay so he mentions the fact that the role of religion in the Middle East has become more manifest and much attention is being paid to a phenomenon variously labeled political Islam the Islamic revival or Islamic fundamentalism he praised Islam as quote as one of the world’s great faiths while noting that its cultural legacy is a rich one in the science arts and culture and intolerance of Judaism and Christianity regime then analyze the Islamist movement in countries throughout the Middle East and North Africa that’s what he says is that we see groups or movements seeking to reform their societies in keeping with Islamic ideas there is concern considerable diversity in how these ideas are expressed we detect no more knowledgeable coordinated international effort behind this movement that diversity is fine he went on so long as there is real political dialogue between government on the one hand and the people in parties and other institutions on the other those who are prepared to take specific steps towards free election creating independent judiciaries promoting the rule of law reducing restrictions on the press respecting the rights the rights of minorities and guaranteeing individual rights will find us ready to recognize and support their efforts just as those moving in the opposite direction will find us ready to speak candidly and act accordingly those who seek to broaden political participation in the Middle East will therefore find us as a support team as we have been helped and elsewhere in the world so indeed Washington has good productive relations with countries and peoples of all religions throughout the world including many whose system of government are firmly grounded in Islamic principles but the US government is suspect of those who will use the democratic process to come to power only to destroy that very process in order to retain power and political dominance while we believe in the principle of one person one vote we do not support one person one vote one vote one time that refers to Algeria there was a coup because Islamist movement had won but people were afraid of what that this movement will use politics in order to stay in power so one man one vote one time Djerejian used the general rule that the concern is political not religious in these words once again in quote religion is not determinant positive or negative and I told you which leads to the takeaway quote of the speech which is the u.s. government does not view Islam as the next ISM confronting the west of returning world peace that is an overly simplistic responses to a complex reality the cold war is not being replaced with a new competition between Islam in the West so here what is extremely fascinating according to me but we can see it seems to be a dual appreciation of what contemporary politics in the Islamic world can be we can hear indeed the two types of interpretation of such a speech there is nothing like next ism but in the same time for the very first time at the highest political and political and diplomatic level in US leadership the new possible threat is acknowledged and framed in such words such words that certain people may feel entitled to identify a paradigm shift in the u.s. global strategy this policy actually was say more or less put into practice and another turning point can happen in September 11 2001 so the idea that these religious extremism could generate a new ISM was once again put under the table and let’s say fearing the Islamist approach so drawing largely on the contacts made with the opponents of regime seen as conciliatory or even as the lives of the Soviet Union during the Cold War American diplomacy it has at least since that time try to understand and work with actors group and groups and movements from the brothers metrics at that time because let me tell you why this also applies to non Sunni Islamist since their importance is read in Middle Eastern Middle Eastern politics the distinctive feature of the American position is truly its consciousness of the fundamentalist character of the Islamist

offer however different administration’s having succeeded in contemporary times have swung between two positions actually more theoretical than practical with regard with regard to the islamist question for instance in 2006 George Bush jr. was questioned by the political participation of the Lebanese Hezbollah in this country I mean and he replied the following I like the idea of people running for office there’s a positive effect maybe some will run for office and say vote for me I look forward to in America but I don’t think so I see people who generally run for office say vote for me I’m looking forward to fixing your potholes Barack Obama publicly said that he was suspicious regarding the father movement of political Islam the Muslim brothers describing them as untrustworthy harboring anti-american views and probably not honoring the camp David peace treaty with Israel although politically this debate and violently had deep ramifications for the incident with an academic field in fact for example the think tanks which are generally considered centrist have been recently distinguishing themselves from the position expressed above by the last two US presidents for example emphasizing the radical nature of Islamist ideology those think tanks have not denied liberal opportunities and in particular the antithesis of a more democratic political political game sorry in which different political forces will be able to express their opinions so this especially true of many reports from the Carnegie Endowment for international peace in the center while other institutions such as such aspiration for the RAND Corporation and the national research defense Institute are characterized by a higher degree of mistrust towards the Western powers this institution for example has in reality produced some analysts that were close to some centrist reviews as well as a more essentialist studies about the Islamic fact and Islamist questioned as an example in Cheryl Benard’s reports the question of democratization within Muslim majority societies is tied to the question of secularisation such that actors who claim a religious identity cannot be considered as privileged partnership it is no surprise that the court introduced new factors explaining the absence of democratization in Muslim countries are generally related to religion and highlights that only a specific way of dealing with Islam in the public and sometimes private sphere is likely to generate a democratization process the solution is simply lie in a major religious reform if there are even more fundamentally this study draws a typology of Muslims in the world dividing them between secularists traditionalists modernists and fundamentalists putting the fundamentalist category the Muslim brothers are not only analyzed as less compatible in democracy with also closer to jihadist organizations such as al-qaeda than other actors then the author the authors argues that there is an ideological and political continuum when we find all the proponents of the radical and political form of islam the problem of committing to a conscious policy towards Islamist consequently also between the assume reality principle and the search for the most suitable strategy to deal with the anti status quo potential included in Islam’s Islamist ideology so these debates for exactly that site because caused great fractures in academia because for some people oriental is tradition that refers to one attack – that had emerged in Europe centuries ago creating multiple discrepancies regarding the integration of both Islamic and Islamist this happened at a time when the United States was taking over the traditional powers from the other side of the Atlantic what Islamism must become one of the major angles of analysis on of the contemporary Muslim world influencing policy makers these various approaches of radical Islam have been convened to justify certain military and diplomatic strategies in the Middle East as providing several of the key framework through which the Islamist issue has been interpreted interpreted these considerations have moreover Illustrated specific comprehension of US foreign policy in the Muslim world starting with the Middle East gain did to a large extent the assumption that political Islam could or could not be reformed to become a religious democratic force in the region is truly connected those debates on the nature of Islam opposing understandings of what u.s. foreign policy should be in this part of the world have been effectively been discussed since the appearance of Islamism as a

major player in most Muslim countries some policymakers and academics are for instance argued that a significant change in US policy in the region would be necessary in order to shape a new landscape that would then create religious actors to be no more moderate and others have to the contrary insisted on the primary essential issue that was Islam’s conceptions of politics minimizing in doing so the role of the US diplomats and the u.s. foreign policy in the Middle East so now when it comes to the Muslim Brotherhood here a bit of theory that I use in my work it isn’t what I want to talk to you about restrictivism it’s because the Muslim brothers have been a target of this commitment policy with Allah so second so why some argue that they are likely to be integrated into the political game other underline that they seek to harm US interests in the region that is key for its safety until the revolution Arab Spring the policy which prevailed was that of the opposition to Hosni Mubarak’s regime and it appears that the last years of the regime in Egypt generated much debate over its sustainability and therefore also much debate regarding the position to protect them towards the actors likely to challenge that power this messy situation situated sorry we did a broader consideration of the necessary democratization of the state in the region the Bush years for instance were characterized by establishment of a democratic push the famous Middle East that also included the Islamist forces in the countries where diplomacy was chosen over military intervention assuming that Islamism represent the potential ally against a systematically violent transnational jihadist the Bush administration promoted a real diplomacy of the opposition that continues to rely on Mubarak’s regime for example but we’ve huge change the major change was that he decided to adopt a new policy he pursued very let’s say very different strategy the time had come to question the foundation on which American foreign policy in the region was built the highest US authorities began to consider redefining the links between the u.s. and undemocratic states and even before the beginning of the Arab Spring why perpetuating the structures of the alliance with Egypt supporting the sovereign right of the people in the Arab world to choose their political limits in the speech in Cairo on June 4 2009 President Obama pursues his thinking in August 2010 with note of 5 pages that went to his highest advisors entitled political reform in the Middle East and North Africa the central argument Obama’s note is the need to stop believing that stability in the region comes from the support of autocratic regimes and that American interests benefit from the absence of a representative government meanwhile for instance at that time Margaret’s Kobe the US ambassador in Cairo said in 2009 that include this five instances whispered discussions no one in Egypt has any certainty about who will eventually succeed Mubarak nor under what circumstances then with other one of the major let’s say changes in the way the US State Department has been defending issue of the Muslim brothers has to do with the working group with Quinn Mecham I don’t know if you were aware of this working group within the policy staff units which is basically a think tank within the US state department so this for the first time at this level you know the issue of political Islam was explicitly addressed Quinn Mecham is very interesting because I had an interview a few weeks ago he’s a professor at Brigham Young University and he’s a specialist the political Islam in international relations and he was the one leading this working group called Gulf Affairs political Islam and global religious affairs and he said to me when I met with him a few weeks ago he said that the idea of including political Islam in his portfolio was clearly connected to his profile there was no interest at that time or explicit interest for political Islam as a topic of concern for the US State Department the idea of the work of the Quinn Mecham working group was basically two things we are in 2008 2009 2010 so prior to revolution the idea is to things to collect first of all the most as much empirical material when it comes to the Islamist parties anywhere in the Arab and outside the Arab world first of all and so to build build up strongly say databases when it comes to instance appears first things and second thing you know try to find out if the wherever it is possible what

can be what the commonalities between the u.s. and the Islamist can be for example are they aware of or are they likely for example to respect the minorities rights or the women’s rights or would they go for let’s say one man one book one type policies seize power one day so the idea was to build up to the biggest for the US diplomat the biggest you know databases that we could in a u.s perspective you know build a policy of model so the month of January is February 20 you saw the power of Mubarak faltered before which he had left in power a Board of Directors composed of soldiers in the wake of the Tunisian Revolution many Egyptians expressed their desire to see the vice president leave in the early days of the protest moment which was physically crystallized by hundreds of thousands of people converging on the Tahrir square the famous square in Cairo the US officials were primarily concerned about the situation of the president yet the question of domestic quickly became central as need for Mubarak’s departure was confirmed it is in this context that Hillary Clinton the state secretary at that time she said in the first days of the demonstrations that America that put people into the streets of Tunis and Cairo adding that these revolutions are not because they are not by us for or for us or against us before noting that the government was able to insert inspirations however the evaluation of the situation quickly changed so has to be room for serious concern if the power did not listen to the revolutionary aspirations there were also concerns about the political situation that could result from a redistribution of power at the highest level of Egyptian state hence the first references to the Muslim Brothers were made reactivating the dual analysis that we had inspired at the highest level of US leadership for many years faced with the amplification of the protest movements the official US position that Clinton either that had until then being a halt to the Egyptian authorities began to converge on a single issue of the president this is well illustrated by the man who would become Secretary of State after departure of Hillary Clinton john kerry who stated that it was time for a critique of US policy towards the region in the opinions pages of the New York Times of January 31 2011 that’s what John Kerry warns about given the events of the past week some are criticizing the very best past tolerance of the Egyptian regime it is true that our public rhetoric is not always match our private concerns but there they are also what a dramatic understanding that our relationship benefitted American foreign policy in promoted peace in the region our interests are not served by watching friendly governments collapse under the weight of the enduring frustration of their own people nor by transferring power to radical groups that would spread extremism for three decades the United States pursued a Mubarak policy now invested with beyond the Mubarak era and devised in Egyptian reports the conditions regarding the departure of Hosni Mubarak and more specifically the role of the United States are still being debated of course at the same time increasing references made to the main Egyptian Islamist movement characterized the content of the US officials talks these speeches were effectively increasingly insisting on the need for a change of leadership or even if regime and less and less on the need for simple reforms even though some voices could still be heard during the month of March and April 2011 to warn against the possible rise to power of domestic brothers leaders as the political transition progresses started to explicitly open the door to domestic brothers in fact between spring and autumn 2011 Hillary Clinton would have had mainly opportunities to the need to deal with the Muslim brothers recognizing that the reasons of the American foreign policy towards certain states in the region should be subject to criticism for example this is when several senior diplomats of the State Department Pentagon officially said that they were in quotes encouraging conversation with an array of opposition leaders including the Muslim Brotherhood the official position of the Obama administration was eventually expressed clearly in June 2011 by Hillary Clinton during a visit to Budapest this is what she said we believe given the changing political landscape in Egypt that it is in the interests of the United States to then engage with all parties that are peaceful and committed to non-violence that intend to compete for the Parliament and the presidency and we welcome therefore dialogue with those Muslim brotherhood members who wish to talk with us and in November 2011 the Secretary of State’s this by comparing the opening of the Egyptian Islamist with the traditional service support afforded to the systems in

control which could be the subject of criticism Hillary Clinton again for years dictators told their people they had to accept autocratic the extremists the extremists appear too often we’ll accept that narrative ourselves well I want you to keep in mind the fact that international relations rely a lot on this analysis and the policy I mean if I were to theoretically the policy adopted by the leadership was this one more or less because of this reality principle the brothers are probably going to be in the election to seize power at the head of the Egyptian state so what we need to do basically when it comes to our official US forces is two things we need to set up what we call an international relations theory key constitutive rules and then try to implement some regulations speaking being the central activity the let’s say calculation may find the US leadership gives an impression once that by input by fixing by setting by establishing this framework the Muslim brothers in power would have nothing to do that’s getting more moderate I’ll give you a couple of examples the idea that the Muslim Brotherhood potential or I mean both moderation potential and revolutionary potential to be attained is the key component of this policy the ideas for example that we had let’s say three basic let’s say frameworks that the brothers had to keep in mind when it comes to dealing with the u.s. first of all as I was mentioning the fact that there are some constitutive rules and regulative rules the constitutive rules are for example commitment to nonviolent strategy the Muslim Brotherhood should avoid being part of violence anytime anywhere the idea that the u.s. want to deal with a peaceful movement is the key component first of all you need to avoid explicitly any sort of or any type of violent strategy what I called the Hobbesian framework so the security frame first of all the Muslim Brotherhood should not pose any security threat to the US state that’s the first thing the second constitutive rule is what he calls to the French philosopher Rousseau you need to commit yourself to a real democratic democratization process you need to respect the popular sovereignty if you go to country power because of free elections you need to understand that one day you will have to leave power because of the elections the Rousseau framework after the Hobbesian framework and the third one it goes through the Locke’s philosophy we need to keep in mind that we are going to be extremely cautious about making you respect the minorities rights the women’s rights and so as long as you are going to stick to these three components you are going to be able to work with you that’s why we mentioned in the the existence of a constitutive rules scheme then in terms of regulated rules now we have examples of here for example this person and that person on the right the woman who is sitting next to the former Muslim Brothers guide I was mentioning in the introduction Ann Patterson has met Mohamed Morsi who worked with the president who used to be the president 32 times in one year and a half period and she said to me what I have times that’s my job to make clear that everything was a force permutation leadership as long as the Muslim Brotherhood leadership stick to this framework so for example I didn’t limit with that example the conflict the Gaza conflict you in 2012 Gaza Strip you know quite frequently the idea for example that the Muslim Brotherhood leadership and of course the Egyptian government this should be a between the Israelis and the Hamas Hamas being an Islamist Palestinian movement connected with the Muslim Brotherhood as we know and Patterson clearly in one of her most famous speeches she said that Morsi did a good job he did well in connecting the Israelis services Israeli services and Hamas leadership and that’s why the conflict was less bloody according to her than it could have been so this connection you know this interaction between what people called constituted rules and regulative rules was beside the key at the heart of the US

diplomacy you know towards the Muslim brothers and when I met you know ambassador Patterson here she told me actually that Morsi did for some aspects for example he was pro-free market economy he was he did nothing wrong when it came for example to making a situation between Hamas and Israel worse but she was much more skeptical about for example you know the Muslim Brothers’ stances when it comes to women and Christians for example she was the say in between then the weapon we draw in terms of lessons you know when we study historically the connections between the brotherhood and the US so as I told you there was first of all a fear of the violent potential of the Muslim brothers so this portion the brothers can be can still be I mean to a large extent in the eyes of many US diplomats they can be or they can advocate for a violent strategy and what the u.s. policy should be to take care of that this movement should always be under control the idea that I’ll give you a very precise example the idea that’s what Obama’s advisor what he told me that is what is the focus of our University he told me that what is problematic when it comes to the Muslim brothers they may reject the use of violence but not as a principle as a strategy so for him at least it is something extremely problematic so this debate is an ongoing today and still be refer to some fears and the idea any US history the idea once again that when they come to power you know they may use they may manipulate you know democracy in order to still remain in power I would say now the Arab revolutions it’s less and less the case because with Tunisia for example to some extent with Egypt because of the military coup the idea there is that we don’t have any example so far it may change but for the US diplomats there is no evidence that the Islamist if they are defeated they would stay in power for example it’s let’s say it’s not even it’s not still a has not you know being empirically I mean tested and then the idea that when it comes to citizenship minorities’ right it’s more or less a grey zone because many US diplomats do think that brothers and Islamists are doing pretty good job that indicates for example what the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood is more problematic some people or many people the US diplomats are clearly divided on this issue for example Mohammed Morsi has been seen described has an honest broker as somebody I mean he was a moderate guy when it comes to my the same rights I mean to all the community in Egypt some other people have been much more skeptical so this idea once again that there is no Islamist policy but it can’t be like that the policy is another key lesson that we have to draw when you study the us progress connections it’s not a bad dealing with the Muslim brothers as such it’s dealing about the Muslim brothers at the death of one state but when they are in the opposition so this clear I mean this extremely important point is clearly connected you know to some scholars like Quinn Mecham I would say John Esposito here the idea that there is no such thing as dealing with Islamism there is something relevant dealing with him at some point in a very specific configuration in a very specific situation with some people with an Islamist narrative and to try to find the motives commonality common ground with them so in terms now of a more long-term I mean the interpretation of this issue throughout recent history let’s say for decades or for almost now one year there are some changes changes or even constants in the u.s. brothers you know connection our relationship for example if I go back to the first archives I was mentioning in the beginning of my presentation can we say that what happened in 2011 2012 2013 is pretty different from what happened in the 60s and 50s because it’s in some ways the same issue these people we know they are here they are part of their societies they are powerful they are influential they have some role to play but what how can we use it or should we use it in order you know to tame them to tame their dark side let’s use this word you know in our interest as US people as US diplomats as US leaders so this is still an ongoing question and I’m not sure absolutely that what happened 50 or 60 years ago is very different from what happened you know in the wake of the Arab the education revolution two final points if you allow me now so is it an issue is it relevant because now it will

no longer the Obama administration but the Trump administration should the Muslim Brotherhood be labeled as a terrorist organization because this is the official position for example of many countries starting with Saudi Arabia the UAE Egypt which Sisi today Sisi has clearly decided that this movement should be labeled as a very dangerous terrorist organization should the u.s. do the same should we be aligning with the authoritarian regimes are positions so we have a key role played by some countries it’s one of them Egypt’s and Gulf States of course and this is an ongoing debate so last June so a few months ago there was a hearing a public hearing I mean at the Congress and some experts of course were were solicited saying for most of them that today the US can be considered can go as far as considering the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization which is not the official position we have lobbies we have people today advocating for this position we cannot say that with Trump there is a clear now position towards the muslim brothers because they are no longer at least so far at least you know temporarily they are no longer a key player in Egypt because they are some of them they are dead they are in prison there was a coup that’s but there is a debate so phrase up of Hamas Hezbollah are considered largely as terrorist organizations shoot the messengers and we consider the same in the title point I had witnessed the very interesting thing in that the Muslim Brotherhood us connection or relations have generated over the last few years a surge of domestic issue or domestic debate here in the u.s. you know the idea that the brothers are no longer a threat you know in Egypt only but also here domestically the idea for example that some muslim brothers are advisers to Obama Administration has become extremely important you know you may read in some circles the idea that it’s no longer a state to foreign demand far away from here issue or topic it’s quite fascinating because now the Egyptian muslim brothers question is clearly an America has become has turned into an American question you know these people I know with Rashad Hussain who was pretty close to Barack Obama which means that being an observant Muslim and not condemning them the Muslim brothers has made a serious threat for the US interests here domestically [discussion, laughter] So that will be my final comment once again it’s an ongoing research so I apologize if this is a bit frustrating for me because it’s not it’s an unfinished research but i’d be happy to have your comments and thank you very much for listening to my presentation one was i don’t know how the perspectives of the islamist leaders i [clapping] thank you for your talk i had two questions one was I don’t know how the perspectives of the Islamist leaders and Muslim Brotherhood leaders changed or evolved or reacted to this policy I know that your topic is US policy towards Islamism but I would like to hear something about their voices and then secondly i don’t know if you have to bring this up to 2019 I know that probably you could write off Trump administration as as being pro-Sisi having a very hostile stance towards the Muslim Brotherhood but is there anything nuance there or is it really is clear cut as it seems from the news okay thank you very much a very interesting question so first of all John yeah the importance of the I agree with you but all it’s about maybe the question is how should we or yeah how should we interpret its speech because now we know what the story was after in the 90s after September 11 then our writings then the partnership between the u.s. and the brothers so we know more than of course in the early nineties well at that time I met Ambassador Djerejian he told me that that’s what he said basically my aim was never to warn anybody about the possible religious read or it’s exclusively I was warning the u.s. public opinion the US leadership you know without any sort of extremism and the idea that some extremists can be religiously motivated

was one of my goals is he I mean is he was he trying to manipulate me because I mean people have extensively written on his speech I don’t know but the idea was to say it was never about religion it was about to the use the political sometimes military use of religion especially in these countries but I had a closer look to the speech and it’s clearly about religion I mean in my view at least so yeah yeah I would say if you jump it back a step in terms of his attitude that what he was doing in that speech was taking religion seriously as opposed to taking religion as the tail-end of traditional society that was being that was being that was disappearing and that’s the difference that he he might say has no political relevance it has political relevance it’s not violent it’s violent we’re against extremism what he does not say in that speech is but we don’t have to worry because religion is disappearing but that’s the kind of stuff you would hear in the early 60s we really don’t have to worry about these guys because it’s disappearing I mean having written in my dissertation in the 1960s on the Islamic on the Sufi movement the number of times you know why don’t you do something that’s really relevant like looking at leftist radicalism you know and and the fact that your agent talks about religion without saying its traditional and disappearing is really the key turning point in that fundamental in a fundamental attitude conceptual framework you you are right because what we’re saying now because my mind I had an interview a few weeks ago with someone called Daniel Pipes yes I’m here to study all the people in there other people whose you know I mean it’s like regardless of regardless of anything the idea is to say for him that he was a loner he felt like he was a loner for years and years and years indicates he told me that I was sane so it was he was saying okay for years and years I pay attention to warning people about the issue of radical Islam and he said to me that that’s what he said basically he was raising concerns on the issue of political Islam was like today focusing on the Chilean foreign policy I mean I was like somebody today who would study the foreign policy of Chile what time period is he talking about like the 1990s he’s talking prior to september 11 yeah for him between the dividing date is September 11 but he was he was trying to persuade people to take religion politically seriously in the 1970s already I mean one of the really one of the he and I disagree I’m a lot of things but back in the 70s we were both trying to say you’ve got to take religion seriously and if you’re looking at Islam don’t just look at the Arabs look at the whole Islamic world and what that meant for policy was something really rather different between him and me but what that meant for an analysis what you looked at you looked at things like the Muslim Brotherhood and took them seriously absolutely and the thing is I mean up to now he’s taking them very seriously the idea that for example there could be no such thing as a moderate Islamist as one of his let’s say core beliefs you know the idea I mean I was my interview with him was like do you believe that for example in Turkey they are more or less moderate he said no they are I mean it was morally acceptable but he he seems to be sticking to the idea that when you are an Islamic fundamentalist especially foreign when you are Islamic you are by definition when going to be radical anyway regardless like what he said I’m talking about what he said – no and that’s that’s another question but you were right that the idea that’s fully – could you put it briefly the idea that religion and specially Islam does matter it’s a shift I mean I mean probably you’re right I agree with you but you his speech was it was linked you know tight to suddenly clear I mean empirical I mean it’s like Algeria Algeria is really important in Afghanistan Afghanistan thank you sir for your for your question the u.s involvement for the yes but the thing is that Afghanistan was a was never described by some people I I’m referred to for example as the Phineas Brzezinski who passed away 20 years ago his famous sense I’m going to give the Russians their Vietnam War know and you know

there is an interview that he made back maybe 15 years ago something like that and he said that I mean the journalist was asking him he idea was to say yeah but we do regret having supported the people who are who would be would become it had to be Talibans and al-qaeda he said of course not I don’t regret because look on the one hand I have a religious extremist movement to deal with it’s not good but it’s under control on the other hand Europe is free there is no longer something called a Soviet Union there is no these nuclear threats I mean that design it used to be you know in the past so I mean it’s a pure realistic I mean you according to him so somebody like would say hey come on you we have to be we got rid of the Soviet Union but now we have al-Qaeda the Islamic state the Middle East is in turmoil in whatever so it’s a matter of perceptions and the thing one of the key questions as far as I understand correct me if I’m wrong is who do you believe what who what positions what senses are made by what kind of people for example I’m not surprised me when you know a bit about how the genesis of some foreign policy conceptions that it’s more Republican Affairs I think believing or tending to believe that Islam can be problematic the Democrats don’t like it I’m not saying that when it comes to diplomacy and political practices it’s necessarily different but the idea idea for example example the last primary prior to the election of Trump you know this elect the Republican race you know the presidential race yes the within the Republican Party yes the primary that impact what once again he told me that I was extremely happy because every single candidate mentioned the Islamism as a as an existential threat for the US and I asked him you know do you think you are we have been influential I hope so I hope I hope I’ve been so the idea that I mean religion is taken seriously that’s the first port in a house are usually it’s it is you know and I have the feeling maybe I’m not gonna be happy to have any discussion on this issue it is most of time a Republican affair am I wrong no and so the u.s. yeah in Afghanistan so I hope I this is a good question so the true question so what about the muslim Brotherhood towards the US well I have it to the volume that you have referred to very kindly actually it’s also extremely fascinating to discuss this mission because even the Muslim brothers are not a monolithic of course they’re not I mean sociologically we knew that now being have studies three studies on these issues I mean there is no such a thing as the Muslim Brotherhood today in terms of sociology anthropology public policy religious beliefs you know many many for example Muslim brothers have turned into Salafist today some have joined us in a region and some other you know are saying that we cannot afford I mean the time of being extremely radical has has passed okay now when we come at the head of the state let’s say with one day and it was actually even before the Revolution the idea that we should consider you know the international system as an area of partnership and not of contending or I mean constant you know sorry contention antagonism opposition whatever you want so it’s something you know that it’s one of the trends within the Muslim Brotherhood you know sort of you have some people say for example that what about the idea of building up a Caliphate or unifying the Muslims worldwide or throughout the world should we give up or should we reframe it or is it still a core principle in what we should believe in should we still believe in this principle and you have some people not only among the Egyptian Muslim brothers I’ll give you an example [Arabic] in Tunisia now he’s saying I never another thing I have we have to give up the Caliph or the unification of Muslims principle but we should do it a peaceful way that the Europeans are building up their European Union so maybe there are going to be Marie Curie for the future I don’t know but the idea is to say we do not give up when it comes to our principle or historical principles but we frame it differently and you have this discourse for example that the u.s is not necessarily the evil but some people they don’t believe that for example the idea that the very very precise example it’s connected to trump the idea that from muslim brotherhood’s or Muslim brothers perspective we have respected democracy we have engaged into institutionalized politics we are pro free elections we have not gone to war I mean on the US

and the West when we were in power okay and in what have we won and we have been tortured we are still tortured we are in prison and some people here in Washington they want to label us as a terrorist movements so these are moderation strategy I don’t like this word between is everybody understand what I mean is it something efficient it did something relevant and worthwhile I mean what have we I mean in terms of gains you know what have we achieved the idea that is okay because it’s also politics as you know is something which is about values in principle it’s also about material gains and material losses the idea for example that Palestine is still under occupation the idea that the West it’s not the West has not a problem with the Islamist in reality that’s I mean I met some of them the West has in reality a problem with Islam look at Islamophobia look at racism for example I mean whatever we would be doing it will never be enough so what the West really wants I’m not saying that that’s what some people say I’m saying I mean they really want us to surrender and then we find again the idea that Islamism to some people is an ideology of resistance I mean it’s much more complicated much more nuanced much more complex as we may imagine but now we are let’s say facing let’s say the trend is really aiming to being less confident because the West for example does not help the Muslim voters who are in prison it was much more or less a positive in their views when Obama was in power there was a huge tension it always was a huge tension the idea for example that there was a conspiracy between the US and the brothers I could agree but I mean give me some material I mean I have been studying the archives there is nothing that hey we are friends and we are going to manipulate the whole world and we are well I don’t so so far there is nothing that is I mean illustrating that but had this idea that okay you we see ambassador charters and I mean 32 times you know Morsi and Ambassador Patterson so there is a connection there is a channel of there is an open the door policy as I called it so it means that the West can be to certain extent can be trusted so it’s always like your weather or news like you know it’s a matter of from both sides you said you had an idea of the moderation strategy how would Turkey and Erdogan play into that because that seems like maybe one partial material success that he is sometimes seems to be supporting political Islamist perspective and he’s being tolerated or accepted by the US actually what we know now years after the the gulf revolution and the coup that the Turkish experience was clearly mentioned as a as a source of let’s call it optimism because the idea that not all Islamists because we need to understand a few things first of all it comes from the debate in academic debates which people here at Georgetown in a few days Harvard Princeton you know the many understandings that we when it comes to political Islam for example Republicans Democrats journalism whatever so it’s it’s it’s a debate an academic discussion and strategic discussions okay on the other side you have political strategies and what was extremely interesting at that time Tunisia would not I did the same with minutiae mostly did the same not poly more see that the brought the main leaders and beheaded at the top of the Muslim Brotherhood why should you do the US why should you fear us when you are working with Saudi Arabia with a religious entity Amman regime you’re working with Islamist who whose name is some Islamist whose name are let’s say for example rich Italian l-dopa so why is it different when it comes to Egypt and the Muslim brothers in Egypt I’ll give you a very precise example and Patterson the former ambassador that’s what she told me she was ambassador prior to this in Pakistan where you have Islamist that’s what she said well I never had never was that say afraid or scared of the Muslim brothers in Egypt because it always seemed to me that they were much much that the world wasn’t licensed with much more moderate than the Pakistani Islamists the situation in Egypt at least when she first came there you know much she she was appointed she said well okay but they are probe for food so I

throw free market economy they seem to be a bit nicer than the one I used to talk to in Pakistan and in Egypt at least there is a revolution and there is some hope so she she used to see Morsi and his friends as let’s say at least ultimately a bit more moderate than the one she knew the ones she used to catch up with in Pakistan so on the scale of moderation in extremism where do you where do you locate a meaning for example the Egyptian Muslim brothers is it about Al Qaeda is it closer to al Qaeda closer to a KP in Turkey and it’s always of course changing so the idea that politics is a matter of perception is really important so for example today here in the US you have some people saying okay but we cannot trust them if they had been first mercy they would have been no cool the coup is interpreted is framed as an issue connected to the Muslim Brotherhood Brotherhood’s ideology if Morsi wanted to save himself he would have been much more inclusive that’s the word you use nothing inclusiveness inclusiveness acuteness the brothers this should have been inclusive and some other people are saying once again that’s an ongoing debate okay but look we could have ourselves you know we’d be more supportive of Morsi because you know he was doing more or less a good job actually we had a transition the situation is much worse today with CC they need more C so the ideas should we website Amin should we should we go for it so it’s always a debate and I think that one of my main let’s say it’s still an unfinished research but I’m not sure that the debate has really because when I started this research I thought that it was like huge evolutions and changing and turning poison by focusing on the 50s and 60s it was not today today’s debate should we trust them I mean but but they do I mean it’s always I mean more or less the same perhaps there are subtle changes but you know I’d be happy to share some archives with some of you but the idea is to say these people they are here we need to deal with them and what can we do so they can you know respect the writing and align with our own interests that’s the key question constant change as the did the us understanding of clipless islam and iran influence how they understood or vice versa or we just it means Tinian Chanin us talking to contain make it seem to do it you met you mean the US diplomacy what was in terms of probably abused the muslim brotherhood and look Lana how I better be a it is you to be in Egypt yes did what they’ve got her on purpose on Iran the key question the key let’s say the key thing was to consider Islamist country by country because for example when I had an interview with Queen make him that’s what he told me I quickly realized that he came to the conclusion that there was no such thing as a transnational political Islam and the idea from that moment onwards was to say that okay we are going to have to collect some relevant data but country by country and when it comes eventually you know possibly to have a policy towards one country or one system is movement in one country it’s going to be a case-by-case discussion it’s going to be a case-by-case I mean yeah case-by-case I mean issue there is no such thing as an Islamist policy there is a policy of engagement for what for example the Islamic world which was a mistake for example if you talk to somebody like Peter amendable they will tell you that we are not because the thing is with Obama that the bush experience the bush mandates were extremely traumatizing we tend to forget that but the idea that we should go for another policy it came in a large part I mean it came from this let’s say trauma the idea that there is no such thing actually as dealing with the Islamists we don’t like their ideology we don’t like Tomas we don’t like the brothers I told me no because Obama was very skeptical I mean but the idea was to say okay but can we find commonality common ground some commonalities so that’s why this queen make am working move I mean at the politics that unit was implemented in order the new to find they say the policies in the the topics I mean only the questions that could make the us and the robbers in this case for example work closer so it’s really something which we should forget the idea that there was a global design a global policy linking the WS only 100 brothers or more generally speaking the Islamist on the other hand it was really a very pragmatic discussion which I joke

now yeah thank you very good talk by the way one suggestion I would have them is on this exact point of this kind of like state parks almost engagement or attempt to reach a place with some Brotherhood groups is that also in the Bush administration they at least began this policy you know I mean that day at the CIA they’ll be luckily they also have it in to be with you okay then you’re aware of it so they also actually created some of these like for example I think them back to the OIC that’s like a critic but I was recommended by them before even though by ministration although wasn’t really operational I believe on ministration so it’s true I think here it was still all the week we don’t really consider the Bush I mentioned did at least try it somewhat engage with these ideas to lesser and maybe not their policy but they have acknowledged yeah that’s important point because there’s this in the Bush administration as a whole idea of like faith-based initiative minute in the in the US they met they start to work a lot more than with some they basically included Muslim community leaders in religious American religious discussions about religion in civil society and so I think that there’s the same may be a certain parallel like now in the in foreign policy which is that if you’re we’re gonna take religion seriously as an administration was the Bush administration was then there’s no reason why you shouldn’t be prepared to reach out with these space groups overseas so I mean ironically re well remember the Bush administration at least notionally had more was much more open to the idea of Muslims and Islam and whistled of democratic forces then many other people would be right I mean he was it’s kind of ironic in the end but I mean he was his entire Middle East policy reserve built on the idea that Muslims and Islam Islam sort of want the same things at Americans and not necessarily just to be liberal wear blue jeans but to be democratic and and relatively moderate even if that means being religious and conservative and another thing is you mentioned this question of viewing and it is in this palms are not coming that says doing things by country basis is that in your opinion extension of the Cold War and then many still do that you know the war will be almost like wherever we saw Tommy’s that aren’t bad you know we won’t feel crazy but we didn’t actually go to conquer countries they are these Vietnamese wonderful comments or they localized naturally because it seems like it really opposite in your opinion with most brothers but at the same time there are indications that they are also hearing as this kind of larger fragile conspiracy when they try to compare for example say the most weather hit in Sudan to Egypt doesn’t make an example of a violent report that’s a very very good question actually according to me there is a clear connection because first of all there is a philosophical reason for that when we think I mean regardless of geopolitics and wherever we use colleges we do not say forget political Islam and we start studying political Islam and and that’s it so for example if you want to observe politically son is very it’s a debate the idea is okay but what are the similarities are the differences that we may identify or single out by the comparison with the past I’ll give you two very precise examples I had an interview last year we’ve got a bird’s was it for me influential you know within the Bush administration my question was does the Cold War free Morgan exactly – question but I mean the meaning was does the Cold War experience has it you know been something important in your way of dealing with the Islamists and he said yes of course the idea here the debate at that time but once again there was not there was deliver was something that the US policy towards communism was never the case some people for example they were there was a debate I is very funny there was a debate in the seventies should we go for example should we work with the Communists who are not let’s say violence and as long as they want to having communists in the West in principle in the Western Europe another later today no 70s it started in the 70s and you know who was the one of the main proponents in this debate the debate that communism can never change because it’s in first a matter first of all first and foremost a matter of ideology Richard Price I mean because you had a debate how can we interpret it how can we see communism is telling withstand even this kind of no I mean the reaction

was missing Kirkpatrick and historians I mean the social school the social explanation of for example communism which was a reaction to this first am I wrong the idea for example that ok ideology does matter but communism it’s also social movements it’s also I mean local many different national experiences and we cannot treat weave or deal with communism as such which was more let’s say the first generation of historiography not the idea and let’s remember that these people did have a new I mean they had a clear you Eastern European background am I wrong so a reaction was okay but you essentialize communism we are going to provide a new kind of work you know which we are not going to deny that to beam ISM is not an ideological strong but we are going you know to enrich our understanding you know by focusing on sociology on social movement theory on in critical history critical theory and this kind of things does it remind you something of something here today the idea for example that ok you can be a Muslim God can you be an Islamist or a Democrat for example this is a pure political science question because it comes from something that has changed I mean empirically we started having or witnessing some people on the ground in Tunisia for example Russia and other people trying to sustain I’m an Islamist I still have any strong Islamic belief I want Islam to be the pro I mean the Mojo of my life but I want to embrace I mean at least some part or totality of the Democratic I mean the framework so is it something that we can trust politically and how do we study this I mean academically for example for example I mean once again I I used I mean in my interview with Daniel Parks he told me that ideology is everything it’s only I mean I mean that’s the main the main the main idea that covers I mean the whole thing for me other people would say that ideology is something that you frame on a daily basis or year after year and it can change because we have new factors I mean influencing and fueling you know new realities and this debate is quite similar to what we have decades ago for example when it comes to comunism in North America or in Europe the idea for example is in a social experience always is first and foremost Audiology that’s things that we had here today I mean for that’s why the idea for example politics political Islam is and will remain dangerous because it’s a global phenomenon as and let’s say the cure how do you cure this support sickness you nationalize Islamism like in the past we used to do what nationalize the communist movements Europe comunism have you ever heard of the Euro communion yeah today we would say it’s not more nationalistic for example Cheney Maha dies first of all is an Islamic movement with a Tunisian identity and if you allow me to answer and to follow up on your questions it’s also an interaction Islam is already aware are the debates we have here in the West about them that’s why in my team we have I mean that’s interesting to have this kind of debates because it has an impact I mean on how Islamist we see themselves and they want to introduce themselves to the rest of the world we are Democrats we are a new generation of Muslims we are no longer instance why must in Democrats you know so how this diversity or diversification of categories and concept it was it equals to what to all these debates and this growing complexity of the Islamist experience worldwide throughout why not do that same thing with violence as well why not have that same narrative of well there is a difference between Abu Sayyaf even in the surprises Messiah and Isis and Al Shabaab are very deep organizations looking the completely national context rather than saying they’re part of global terrorism and just because we declare war on cares about one of that’s it I mean they happy bad were not seen as a global friends Connie bonds were seen as a threat security threat because of what not because of their me of course the I it’s always when you want to convince people you you highlight their ideology they how they treat women they are violent they punish I mean they punish people by hanging them or okay but the Taliban it’s because they were the partners of the Madinah means the Qaeda that’s why that’s what that basically what the reason that the motivation was so the idea that the jihadis today they are present the trans national security threat has clear implication when it comes to political Islam the legalists that’s committed this way so the idea I give you a very very interesting questions if I am a u.s. leader or you can either if I work with the Islamists am I going to be enforce the nonviolent side at the detriment of the jihadist ultimately or am i reinforcing the jihadist because there is a continuity between them there is a difference of degree not of nature between Morsi and Bradley Friesen so and

it’s once again more or less what we have witness to witness up to the decades ago when it came to mean community the idea actually I mean once again I mean and it’s quite interesting because you have even at a very individual level you have connection between the historians who are splitting both topics yeah yeah and yeah you can tell this is like a family history of the pipes and Gaffney’s Frank yeah yeah okay well thanks very much I’m sure if there’s questions afterwards thank you very much and thanks for more you look forward to the book well yeah thank you thank you for all which is some pressure again